Introduction
How should we understand the duties between those who share in parenting a child?
1 Most would agree that the duties between such parents are shaped by the child's interests. For example: parents have negative duties to refrain from preventing each other from satisfying the child's interests; parents also have positive duties to coordinate with each other to ensure that the child's important interests are met.
I am grateful to Jonathan Seglow, Lila Gailling, the journal's editors and reviewers, and audiences at the University of Leicester and the Manchester Workshops in Political Theory for discussion and comments on previous versions. 1 For the sake of simplicity, I concentrate on the example of two adults sharing in parenting a child.
However, nothing is implied regarding the value or normalcy of such a family form, and the argument applies to any number of parents in any kind of relationship who have decided to share in parenting a child. David Archard (Archard 2010) has helpfully distinguished between parental obligations (obligations to ensure that a child is parented), and parental responsibilities (obligations of parents towards their children). This paper leaves aside what Archard describes as parental obligations, and deals only indirectly with parental responsibilities towards children. The main concern is with the (narrow) question of what those who have decided to share in parenting owe to each other. Clarification of this question may help inform policy decisions on the enforcement of duties of sharing between parents, but such questions involve a range of further considerations which go beyond the scope of this paper. In this paper I therefore leave aside the policy implications to focus on clarifying the nature of the moral duties of shared parenting.
However, the duties of shared parenting are not exhausted by the interests of the child. Those who engage in shared parenting have duties to each other derived from the child's interests, but they also have additional duties to each other as sharers in parenting. These additional duties are constituted by a combination of the general features of forming a shared intention, and by the special features of sharing an intention to parent a child.
The account of duties of shared parenting presented here fits within the intentional account of the normative dimension of parenthood. 2 The intentional account bases the special duties of parents (and subsequent rights in fulfilment of those duties) on adults' voluntary choice to adopt the role of parent. This is part of a more general view that special duties can only be acquired through voluntary undertaking, or as a duty of compensation resulting from a harm caused to another.
A compelling feature of the intentional account is that it elucidates widely held intuitions regarding the moral status of parents who have no genetic or gestational relationship with their children, such as adoptive parents, parents whose children are the result of donor eggs and sperm, and parents who use surrogates. However, the voluntarist account is also vulnerable to the criticism that it fails to explain the stringency of parental duties (Brake 2010, p.169) . The intentional account appears not only to allow that parents can acquire parental responsibilities voluntarily, but also that they can relinquish them voluntarily. The voluntariness of parental duties is thus seen as threatening to the interests of children. This paper extends concern for the apparent voluntary revocability of parental duties towards children to duties between parents. If duties between parents are derived from their choice to raise a child together, then are those duties extinguished simply when one parent chooses to no longer share parenting? I argue: no.
Whilst duties between those who share in parenting are derived from their intention to parent together, these duties cannot be extinguished simply if one party no longer intends to share parenting. Whilst duties of shared parenting are created from the separate intentions of individuals, they cannot be relinquished by the individuals separately. The stringency of the duties of shared parenting is derived from a combination of the moral significance of sharing an intention, and the distinctive properties of sharing an intention to parent a child. This paper therefore seeks to refute criticisms that the intentional account of parenthood leaves duties between parents susceptible to changes of individual intentions.
The paper begins in part one with a scenario to elucidate the problem of duties of shared parenting within the intentional account of parenthood. The scenario reveals the problem that the intentional account seems unable to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting. The response to this problem begins in part two by describing the general structure of shared intentions and their moral significance, drawing on the work of Bratman, Alonso, and Scanlon. Duties of shared parenting are derived from the importance of reliance in shared intentions. Part three considers an apparent invidious choice between voluntarism and strict performance of an agreement in the shared intention account of duties between parents. Duties of shared parenting are shown to be stringent, but not duties of strict performance.
Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the distinctive combination of the value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy is deciding one's goals, and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. This constitutes the shared intention account of duties between parents. Is the intentionalist account of special duties able to respond to these criticisms? When adults decide to share in parenting a child together, this creates duties of (at least) two different kinds. 5 Firstly, there are the duties acquired when the role of parent is adopted. 6 These are duties towards the child, derived from the child's interests. Parental rights against others protect the adult in fulfilment of their fiduciary duties towards the child. In most cases, role based duties are derived from the goal or function associated with the role. 7 When Andy and Belle decide to adopt the role of parent, both acquire responsibilities through their commitment to 5 The focus of this paper is to distinguish duties of parents towards their children from duties of shared parenting. I leave open that there are further duties on parents, for example towards society in virtue of society's interest in children's development. 6 For a discussion of the importance of the role of parenthood within the intentionalist account, see (Hannan & Vernon 2008) 7 For a fuller account of the role-based approach to rights, see (Hardimon 1994) perform the functions and fulfil the ends of being a parent. Thus special duties of parents towards children are acquired when the adult chooses to fulfil the role of parent individually. However, there is a second kind of duty that forms between adults who decide to share in parenting a child together. These are the duties Andy and Belle owe each other as sharers, independent of the duties they owe Charlie as parents. Just as in the role based account of parental responsibilities, duties between sharers are derived from the intentions of adults. However, these responsibilities are not derived from the intentional adoption of the role of parent, but rather from the intention to perform a task in a shared manner. When Andy and Belle decide to share parenting of Charlie, they create duties in how they should relate to each other in the shared task. Importantly, by deciding to share in the parenting of Charlie, Andy and
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Belle created duties to each other in how they parent Charlie. These duties subsequently constrain their ability to independently rescind on their decision to share in parenting. By rescinding on his duty as sharer, Andy wronged Belle, even if he did not wrong Charlie. By focusing on intentions as the basis on which parental duties are acquired, the voluntarist account seems to suggest that such special duties may be extinguished by a change in intentions. This is not a necessary implication of the intentional view however. Duties of shared parenting are constituted by the distinctive combination of the value of reliance in shared intentions, the importance of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy is deciding one's goals, and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares the intimacy of parenting. Thus the shared intention account of special duties is able to explain why sharing creates duties, and why sharing in parenting creates duties which are particularly stringent.
Duties between Sharers
Shared Intentions
When individuals form an intention to share in parenting, they are making plans about how they will parent together in the future. The formation of a shared intention may be the result of an explicit promise or agreement, but neither are a necessary condition for the formation of shared intentions. Individuals may find that a shared intention emerges gradually without explicit agreement regarding the commitment to share. Michael Bratman points out that promises are insufficient to explain shared goals as they may be insincere and individuals may have no intention to fulfil the promise; indeed, individuals may share a goal without having made a promise, as in Hume's case of two rowers in a row boat who row together though they have made no promise to each other to row (Bratman 1993, p.98 ). Bratman argues that shared plans are explained by a particular relationship between the intentional attitudes of individuals. For Bratman, intentions are important because they structure planning about ends. Two individuals share an intention when they both aim at the same outcome; when they both know that they both aim at the same outcome; when knowing that the other aims at the same outcome is a reason for aiming at the same outcome; and when they proceed towards the same outcome in a coordinated manner (Bratman 1993, p.106) .
It is insufficient for an intention to be shared simply that both individuals aim at the same end: this would be a co-incident intention. In order for an intention to be shared it is necessary that both individuals take the other's aim that they act together as an additional reason for them to pursue the same aim. They seek to attain that aim through means that are co-ordinated because of the other's aims and means. For individuals to form an intention to share in parenting a child, both must come to know that the other wishes to raise a child together, and that the other's aim of raising the child together becomes part of their own aim. In other words, I must intend that we parent a child together, and you must intend that we parent a child together. To intend to do something together with another person partly because the other person intends to do it together is characteristic of a shared intention.
Forming shared intentions with someone can trigger moral responsibilities, but not necessarily. Shared intentions may be formed under conditions of coercion, or by individuals intending to share in an immoral act. But when individuals form shared intentions to a parent a child in its best interests freely, duties of sharing are triggered between them.
The General Structure of Shared Intentions and Interpersonal Duties of Reliance
When Andy and Belle form a shared intention to parent Charlie together, moral duties are created between them. Some, such as Margaret Gilbert, have argued that interpersonal duties are a necessary feature of shared intentions (Gilbert 1992; Gilbert 2000) . But this seems too strong a claim, as individuals can form shared intentions to perform immoral acts (Alonso 2009, p.446) . It cannot be a necessary feature of a shared intention to act immorally that the intenders have a duty to perform the act. Others, such as Michael Bratman, have argued that interpersonal duties may follow from shared intentions, but are not intrinsic to them (Bratman 1993; 1999) . However, this is too weak a claim as, other than in cases of intending to perform an immoral act, it seems intuitive that there are strong duties between Shared intentions, absent special circumstances, create interpersonal duties between sharers because they create relationships of reliance. The intentional account of parenthood is therefore able to explain both how parents acquire special duties towards their children, and also how they acquire special duties towards others with whom they share parenting. By explaining the moral significance of 8 These principles are reformulations of Scanlon's versions to include the broader notion of assumptions rather than expectations, see (Scanlon 2003, pp.239-240) sharing intentions, we are able to explain the existence of duties of sharing. In the moral accounting of sharing an intention, there are (at least) two sets of duties:
duties on individuals regarding actions they perform together; and duties of reliance towards each other as sharers.
Returning to Andy and Belle, we can now see that in forming a shared intention to parent Charlie together, they acquired duties towards both Charlie and each other.
The interpersonal duties between Andy and Belle are derived from the reliance that follows from sharing intentions. The shared intention account of parental duties is therefore able to explain the existence of duties between Andy and Belle. But is this account able to explain the stringency of the duties between shared parents?
On the intentional account, the special duties of parents are acquired through intentionally adopting the role of parent. Just as one may intentionally adopt the role and acquire the duties of parents, it seems implied that one may choose to relinquish the role and duties of parenthood. Principle L* appears to allow for this, provided sufficient compensation is provided for losses incurred by withdrawing from shared parenting. In deciding independently to no longer share in the parenting of Charlie, Andy caused significant loss to Belle because she had relied on sharing parenting 
The Stringency of Duties of Shared Parenting
Voluntarism and Strict Performance: an Invidious Choice?
Individuals who share intentions have interpersonal duties to prevent loss caused by failing to meet expectations they create in others. According to Principle L*, these are not duties of strict performance ( Alonso 2009, p.467; Scanlon 2003, p.240) . It is important that duties of shared parenting are not matters of strict performance because strict performance seems at odds with the voluntarist account of special duties. According to the voluntarist view, special duties are acquired either voluntarily or through causing harm to someone. The claim that duties persist, even when someone no longer wishes to share parenting and has provided compensation, appears to neglect the normative significance of voluntarism in the acquisition of special duties. Belle's demand that Andy continue in shared parenting, even when he has compensated her for loss, seems to restrict unreasonably his freedom to form and relinquish special duties. Andy has taken reasonable steps to prevent loss by compensating Belle for his decision to no longer share in parenting Charlie (and was not negligent in creating the expectations as they were made in good faith). Does this leave Belle with no legitimate claims against Andy regarding shared parenting?
The intentional account of duties of shared parenting seems to leave us with an invidious choice regarding the stringency of Belle's claims against Andy. Either we say that Andy has discharged his duties to Belle by providing reasonable compensation, in which case we must abandon intuitions that Belle has on-going claims against Andy to continue sharing in parenting. But this seems to fail to account for the stringency of duties between those who share parenting. Or, we accept that Belle has legitimate claims against Andy to continue sharing in parenting, in which case we must regard agreements between sharers as creating duties of strict performance.
But this seems over-demanding as an account of interpersonal duties between sharers, given that it is legitimate for both individuals who share an intention to agree not to perform an intended action. 9 The shared intention account of duties between parents is however able to resolve this apparent paradox. Duties of shared parenting are constituted by a distinctive combination of the importance of assurance in agreements, the significance of autonomy in deciding one's goals, and the entitlement to choose with whom one shares parenting. Duties of shared parenting are stringent, but not duties of strict performance.
The Values of Assurance and Autonomy in Duties of Shared Parenting
When we come to rely on each other through forming a shared intention, our central interest is in sharing. Compensation may be required to remedy loss caused by failure of sharing. But our interest in compensation is not simply equivalent to our interest in performing the action in a shared manner. Scanlon describes this interest in the performance of action that one has come to rely on as derived from the value of assurance (Scanlon 2003, p.243) . Assurance is of value because it provides the psychological benefits of peace-of-mind about plans for the future, but also because one has an interest in that which is agreed actually coming about. The value of assurance pervades many kinds of agreements, such as promises and contracts where we have an interest not only in being compensated for loss, but also in the fulfilment of that on which we rely. The value of assurance applies also therefore to shared intentions, at least those where sharers rely on sharing. Scanlon describes this as the Principle of Fidelity, summing up duties of assurance where we have a primary 9 For a defence of the view that duties of sharing require strict performance see (Gilbert 1993) interest in the performance of that to which we have agreed (Principle F*) (Scanlon 2003, p.245) .
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When applied to the special nature of shared parenting, the value of assurance in agreements begins to resolve the invidious choice. The value of assurance explains why Andy cannot unilaterally relinquish his duties merely by providing material compensation. Belle's decision to adopt the role of parent was based in part on Andy's assurance that this would be a shared task. Thus Belle has an interest in Andy sharing parenting. Andy's failure to share creates both pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss for Belle, and he has a duty to provide compensation for both.
Andy may compensate Belle fully for the material loss of his withdrawal of sharing by ensuring that Belle is in as good a position materially as she was before. But to offer
Belle material compensation for his failure to share is not simply to make good a material loss, it is to attempt to replace Belle's interest in sharing with an alternative interest: single parenting adequately compensated. But Belle is entitled to choose her own ends autonomously. Thus the value of assurance combined with the value of autonomy in deciding one's ends explain why Andy is not entitled to unilaterally rescind his agreement to share parenting. By deciding independently to substitute material compensation for his contribution to sharing, Andy violates Belle's entitlement to autonomy in deciding her own ends. This is similar to what Robert
Goodin describes as the wrong of '…forced intrapersonal redistributions between a person's plans and projects' (Goodin 1989, p.69) . So the wrong that Andy performs in withdrawing his sharing is not simply creating a material and non-material loss for which he is obliged to provide compensation. Andy also wrongs Belle by preventing her from pursuing her goal of shared parenting and attempting to substitute it with a different goal against her wishes: sufficiently resourced single parenting. Thus the combination of the importance of autonomously choosing one's ends and the value of assurance of an agreement being fulfilled explain why Andy is under a duty to continue sharing. Andy has a stringent duty to fulfil his duties as sharer, in spite of his offer of compensation to Belle.
The Value of Intimacy in Duties of Shared Parenting
Andy may recognise that he has a duty to fulfil Belle's expectations that parenting be shared, and that it is impermissible to attempt to alter that goal unilaterally. for Belle to reject to the offer of a replacement sharer with whom to share. Belle is permitted to reject this because of her entitlement to choose those with whom she has an intimate relationship.
Belle is entitled to insist that Andy fulfils his agreement to share parenting on grounds of the value of assurance in fulfilling agreements, and the importance of autonomy in choosing ones ends. Belle is also entitled to reject offers of substitute sharers due to the special intimacy involved in shared parenting. The importance of autonomy, the value of assurance, and the role of intimacy in parenting resolves the invidious choice with which the intentional account of parenthood seemed to be 
Conclusion
Deciding to share in parenting a child creates special duties between adults: duties toward the child as parent; and duties towards each other as sharers. The intentional account of parental duties appears unable to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting. It appears to permit a parent to unilaterally withdraw from shared parenting provided they compensate the other parent adequately. However, it seems reasonable for a parent who has come to rely on their partner to share in parenting to demand not simply compensation, but continued sharing. Despite appearances, the intentional account of parental duties is able to explain the stringency of duties of shared parenting. This explanation is provided by recognising the distinctive duties that are created when persons form shared intentions. Shared intentions, whilst not intrinsically normative, constitute relationships of reliance between sharers.
Relationships of reliance are of normative significance because individuals who share intentions form expectations about each other's beliefs and actions in the future.
Certain duties of sharing may be relinquished by one party unilaterally if sufficient compensation is provided for loss due to unfulfilled expectations, or if a replacement sharer is provided. But duties of shared parenting are not so easily extinguished.
When individuals agree to share, their goal is to share. If one sharer unilaterally withdraws from sharing and attempts to substitute financial compensation for sharing, then they have forced the other sharer to substitute sharing for money. This violates the value of autonomy of individuals to choose their own ends. Those who share parenting are also not entitled to unilaterally relinquish their duty to share if they provide alternative sharers, such as grandparents or nannies. This is due to the special features of shared parenting. Parenting is a particularly extended, pervasive, and profound commitment that often involves intimacy between parents. Individuals are entitled to decide with whom they share such an intimate act as parenting a child. They may though accept such offers of replacement sharers and release the other from their duties. Thus duties of shared parenting are stringent but not duties of strict performance. Duties of shared parenting persist even if one party wishes to share no longer; duties of shared parenting persist until both parties agree they are dissolved. The shared intention account of duties between parents is therefore able to retain the intentionalist concern for voluntarism as the basis for special obligations, whilst explaining the stringency of duties of shared parenting.
